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Introduction
The statutory landscape on personal information sharing more generally is currently on the cusp of potentially massive change. The Data Protection Act 1998 – which will be reformed through the actions of the Article 29 Working Party on Data Protection​[1]​ – is transposed into law in England and Wales by the Data Protection Act 1998 – and one of the concepts under review with the new Data Protection Directive is the definition of ‘personal data’ itself​[2]​. 

In the criminal justice context, at the time of writing, the leaked Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive shows that there will be a separate framework at the European level for information sharing (that is, ‘data processing’) principles to be followed by 'competent authorities’ sharing information ‘for the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences, authorised by law to process personal data for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties’​[3]​. The Human Rights Act 1998 will potentially be replaced by the British Bill of Rights​[4]​ – losing the link and ‘interpretive’ role between the courts in England and Wales and the European Convention on Human Rights, and hence article 8 ECHR and the right to respect for a private life, as well as Strasbourg jurisprudence on privacy issues​[5]​. 

As for the issue of criminal records stigmatising convicted offenders, the current Minister for Justice, Ken Clarke, has announced proposed reforms to the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 framework – generally looking to reduce the time offenders must declare their criminal convictions as unspent, although not with regard to offenders who were imprisoned for lengthier prison sentences, starting at the level of four years imprisonment​[6]​.

The Ministry of Justice have published information on the impact of these reforms, detailing the new periods of time that an offender would need to continue their convictions to most prospective employers, before they become ‘spent’, as follows​[7]​:

Sentence (custodial sentences include licence period) 	Current adult rehabilitation period, starting from date of conviction 	New adult rehabilitation period, starting from end of sentence. (with maximum total period of sentence and rehabilitation) 	Current youth rehabilitation period, starting from date of conviction 	New youth rehabilitation period, starting from end of sentence. (maximum total period of sentence and rehabilitation) 
 Absolute discharge 	 6 months 	 None 	6 Months 	None 
 Fine 	 5 years 	 1 year from conviction 	2.5 years 	6 months from conviction 
Community order 	 5 years 	 1 year
(4 years) 	 2.5 years 	 6 months
(3.5 years) 
0-6 Months 	7 Years 	2 years
(2.5 years) 	3.5 years 	18 months
(2 years) 
6-30 Months 	10 Years 	4 years
(6.5 years) 	5 years 	2 years
(4.5 years) 
30 Months - 4 years 	Never spent 	7 years
(11 years)  	Never spent 	3.5 years
(7.5 years) 
Over 4 years 	Never spent 	Never spent 	Never spent 	Never spent 


As well as the disclosure of criminal convictions and other ‘police intelligence’, stigmatising offenders in the employment context, personal privacy issues arise from the processes of personal information sharing across the criminal justice system in England and Wales, which can involve information being shared in prosecutions; where personal information is used as criminal evidence in criminal trials, potentially as items of hearsay evidence​[8]​ and bad character evidence​[9]​. Interestingly, both hearsay evidence and bad character evidence in criminal trials are regulated by a codified statutory framework in the form of provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003​[10]​. 

But personal privacy issues arise from the processes of personal information sharing with a diverse array of public authorities and employers by the police and other criminal justice agencies​[11]​ in England and Wales to further the aims of PPNs. Information sharing also occurs across the criminal justice system in relation to the aims of probation organisations​[12]​, as well as a growing European dimension to information sharing across criminal justice systems​[13]​ including England and Wales.
The thrust of this article is to explore some of the details of the complex framework statute and case law relating to ‘criminality information sharing’, since this is an area of great scope for shedding understanding on key issues in public law, including a procedural concept of proportionality, the importance of statutory codification and the nature of privacy in English law.
A particular perspective on privacy 
When we must turn to offering up an explanation of how privacy subsists in a system and framework of moral and legal rights, we must choose between a number of epistemologies. One irrefutable epistemology in an argument for legal recognition of personal privacy rights is that which De Bruin calls the ‘argument from relationships’ – the observable notion that the sharing of information across boundaries of information possession changes the views and opinions, and hence the resulting actions and decisions, that individuals (and society or institutions) form and share about other individuals​[14]​. Empirically, Moreham’s survey of article 8 ECHR cases that define the notion of a private and family as seen by the European Court of Human Rights shows us that privacy rights derived from personal relationships are many-faceted​[15]​.
The complex nature of privacy issues in relation to freedom of expression: The coming impact of Von Hannover No.2 and Axel Springer?

On 7 February the European Court of Human Rights published two decisions with privacy law implications for the UK. They are clear re-statements of the law relating to the publications of photographs and accompanying news articles as these media activities engage the right to respect for private and family life (art. 8 ECHR), while drawing on the right to freedom of expression (art. 10 ECHR) contemporaneously.

In finding there had been no violation of the positive obligations owed under article 8(1) ECHR following amendments in German law with regard to the publication of photographs that engage right to a private life of an individual, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights said at para. 106 in Von Hannover No.2​[16]​:

“In cases such as the present one, which require the right to respect for private life to be balanced against the right to freedom of expression, the Court considers that the outcome of the application should not, in theory, vary according to whether it has been lodged with the Court under Article 8 of the Convention, by the person who was the subject of the article, or under Article 10 by the publisher. Indeed, as a matter of principle these rights deserve equal respect…”

The Grand Chamber then went on to outline the complex criteria to be used in this balancing exercise concerning the tension between Articles 8 and 10 (at paras. 108 to 113):

	Contribution to a debate of general interest (typically including political and criminal issues, as well as sporting and entertainment issues or the arts – though not infidelities or financial woes of a private nature)
	How well known is the person concerned and what is the subject of the report? (Considering the potential public role or function of the subject of the photo, or lack thereof, and their public or private nature of the action within the report or photo – with little weight given to mere satisfaction of public curiosity alone)
	Prior conduct of the person concerned (and whether the photo was previously published, though not necessarily previous co-operation or consent to publication)
	Content, form and consequences of the publication (including the manner of publication of the photo and the accompanying report, as well a the extent of publication and circulation)
	Circumstances in which the photos were taken (including issues of consent, possible subterfuge, the nature or seriousness of the intrusion, the consequences of the publication and the likelihood the subject of the photo was previously unknown to the public)

When considering the proportionality of an injunctive measure or similar sanction against a media entity which has, or is about to publish an image or article that engages article 8(1) ECHR and the right to respect for a private life, regard must be had by the courts to the following headings or criteria (paras. 89-95) lest there be a violation of the right to freedom of expression in article 10(1) ECHR, as in the case of Axel Springer​[17]​:

	Contribution to a debate of general interest (including crime, political issues, sport, arts or entertainment – but not merely infidelity or financial difficulties alone)
	How well known is the person concerned and what is the subject of the report? (Considering the potential public role or function of the subject of the photo, or lack thereof, and their public or private nature of the action within the report or photo – with little weight given to mere satisfaction of public curiosity alone)
	Prior conduct of the person concerned (and whether the photo was previously published, though not necessarily previous co-operation or consent to publication) 
	Method of obtaining the information and its veracity (regard should be had to whether the party obtaining the photo/information was acting in good faith and on an accurate factual basis and whether they could be said to provide “reliable and precise” information in accordance with the ethics of journalism)
	Content, form and consequences of the publication (including the manner of publication of the photo and the accompanying report, as well a the extent of publication and circulation)
	Severity of the sanction (to be) imposed (that is, ‘the nature and severity of the sanctions imposed’)

These important reciprocal criteria or tests, now laid out more clearly, and definitively will now eventually feed themselves into the reasoning of UK courts concerned with claims for remedies in media privacy cases, and appeals against the same by media organisations, as long as the interpretive duty with regard to Strasbourg case law sits on UK judges because of s.2 of the Human Rights Act 1998. It remains to be seen exactly what our judges do with them. These two recent Strasbourg decisions highlight the complex tension between values of personal privacy and freedom f expression in society. Criminality information sharing, however, is concerned with a different tension: the relationship between personal privacy rights and the wider societal value of public protection.

The complex nature of privacy issues in relation to public protection

The European Court of Human Rights has laid out guidance through case law on the issue of the publication of photographs and accompanying news articles where privacy and freedom of expression are values in contest (see above).

There are similarities between these ‘checklist’ criteria and the relevant ACPO checklist with regard to information sharing:

‘Checklist 9 – Decisions Relating to Sharing Public Protection Information’

	“Why should information be shared?”
	“How would sharing information reduce the risk to the public?”
	“Is there another practical and less intrusive means of protecting the public?”
	“What is the legal basis for sharing information in this particular case (e.g. purpose under the DPA)?”
	“Is there a possibility of increasing the risk of violence to an individual(s), leading to public disorder?”
	“Could the offender be driven underground?”
	“What would the effect be on victims?”
	“What would be the effect on members of the offender’s family?”
	“What would be the effect on the ability of an offender to live a normal life?”
	“Exactly what information would be shared and with whom?”
	“Has the offender or PDP been consulted about the proposed information sharing as part of the risk management plan, and asked their views?”​[18]​

‘Checklist 10 – Sharing Public Protection Information’

“Whenever public protection information is shared the individual taking that action should ensure that:

	“The decision-making process [above] has been adhered to and documented.”
	“It has been established exactly what information the individual or agency receiving the information has already, so that information is not shared unnecessarily.”
	“The correct individual has been given the information and knows what to do and what not to do with it (e.g. the confidential status of the information and any action expected as a result of it).”
	“The correct information has been shared.”
	“Full details of the information sharing decision and action has been recorded, including when the information was provided, the content of the information, with whom the information was shared, and the purpose of sharing it.”​[19]​

An individual’s ‘informational privacy’ would be infringed, following De Bruin on the ‘Argument from Relationships’, when the sharing of personal information impacts negatively upon autonomy. De Bruin highlights the notion of decision-making processes that rely upon the sharing of personal information as indicative of a kind of ‘informational privacy’ that is dependent upon privacy values expressed as ‘negative freedom’ i.e. freedom from intrusion to autonomy in some way.
De Bruin says: 
“…the connection between privacy and negative freedom has a three-step structure. The first step is the very disclosure of information. A sender, A, discloses information about a subject, B, to a recipient, C. (Note that A and B may be identical.) Disclosure is used in a general sense here, as it may involve not only speaking and writing but also drawing C's attention to a certain scene involving B that is happening right now…The second step covers belief revision. On the basis of the information obtained from A, agent C revises her earlier beliefs about B… Finally, the third step involves action. The new beliefs may motivate C to perform a certain action she would not have performed if A had not given her the information concerning B; and if performing this action constitutes interference with B, then B's negative freedom has been reduced as a result of an invasion of privacy.” [My emphases.]​[20]​ 
Personal information sharing across and beyond the criminal justice system in England and Wales has been repeatedly acknowledged as a conflicted issue in need of a more certain and transparent legal ‘framework’ or ‘landscape’​[21]​. The competing interests are those of individual personal privacy, and corresponding freedom from subjective privacy harms​[22]​, and the wider issues of public protection​[23]​. Indeed, Sir Ian Magee has it that the timely and appropriate sharing of information about ‘risky’ individuals across and without the criminal justice system creates “public protection networks” (PPN)​[24]​. Magee also describes this ‘police intelligence’ as ‘criminality information’​[25]​, though in the light of the legal framework, which uses terms like ‘personal data’​[26]​ and ‘sensitive personal data’​[27]​, as well as ‘personal information’​[28]​, this is a further vagary of terminology.
ACPO guidance uses the term ‘public protection information’ – representing a professional and institutional ethos concerning public protection for policing authorities​[29]​.
Electronic governance and ‘dataveillance’​[30]​ depend on the effective deployment of information technology systems across operational organisations boundaries and even legal jurisdictions​[31]​.
The Police National Computer (PNC) and the Violent and Sexual Offenders Register (ViSOR) are two example or multi-databases which are used operationally to provide ‘police intelligence’ on individuals that is used to affect decision making that concerns those individuals, chiefly in the detection, investigation, prosecution and punishment of crimes, as well as parole and probation practices and decisions, and the wider employment vetting setting​[32]​, whilst some databases and risk assessment software that draws on databases form part of the wider criminal justice e-governance context (for example, the Electronic Offender Assessment System (e-OASys)​[33]​ is used to ‘process’ ‘personal data’ and ‘sensitive personal data’ in a human rights-sensitive probationary context).
(Enhanced) Criminal Record Certificates (ECRCs) are, by the measure of the number of judicial review cases which target them as a disclosure method, the most contested instances of personal information sharing in the sense of the work of the criminal justice system​[34]​ and, specifically, the role of the police in divulging information to employers and volunteering co-ordinators in the vetting process; where children and vulnerable adults must be ‘safeguarded’​[35]​.
Timothy Pitt-Payne gives us some context:
“CRB checks are an increasingly common feature of working life. Some CRB disclosures (known as standard disclosures) are confined to information about past convictions held on the Police National Computer (PNC), including convictions that have become spent under the Rehabilitation of Off enders Act 1974. Other disclosures--known as enhanced disclosures--may, in addition, include information from local police records about matters other than convictions. Such non-conviction information is sometimes known as "soft intelligence". It may include information about acquittals, or allegations that have never been the subject of the trial, or even about matters other than allegations of criminal conduct. Standard disclosures are available in all cases where employers are entitled to ask prospective employees about their spent convictions. Enhanced disclosures are available for a wide range of individuals working with children and vulnerable adults. In 2008-09, a total of 274,877 enhanced disclosures were given; and 21,045 of them disclosed soft intelligence.”​[36]​

The Protection of Freedoms Bill, at the time of writing before Parliament, will reform some procedural though not substantive principles on vetting procedures and the ECRC disclosure process, which are currently under the auspices of the Independent Safeguarding Authority (ISA) and the Criminal Records Bureau respectively, aided by the Central Criminal Records Office. 
Furthermore, as Sunita Mason has commented, the Independent Advisory Panel on Criminal Records Disclosures will report by the end of 2011, and is likely to recommended sweeping reforms of the relationship between the vetting process and the relevant provisions of the Police Act 1997 and the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974​[37]​. The Ministry of Justice appear to have acted upon these proposals with alacrity (see above).
Mason has noted that the “business rules”​[38]​ once considered sufficient as ‘filtering’ standards in order to balance the infringement of privacy rights against the wider societal need for public protection should be put on a statutory footing​[39]​, and in a manner reflective of core public law values​[40]​. For example, it is felt that a right to challenge the contents of an Enhanced Criminal Record Certificate is a new procedural benefit for those subjects of ‘criminality information’ sharing, especially considering that the potential employer in a vetting scenario will only see  copy of the Certificate if the individual wishes them to see it, but the ethos of ‘criminality information’ sharing itself will remain relatively opaque and uncertain without detailed statutory guidance from Parliament on what is appropriate sharing , rather than what is the correct process of sharing the information​[41]​. Additionally, there will be, for example, an ability to challenge the contents of an ECRC by appealing to the Home Office if the Protection of Freedoms Bill currently before Parliament is enacted.
Criminality information sharing in practice
Bellamy et al have noted that some informal, non-process driven or ‘organic’ [my term] information sharing is prima facie unlawful, and that some is ‘organic’ but lawful:

“Interviews conducted for [our] study revealed that, in a few cases, informal workarounds lead to law-breaking, mainly by contravening data protection legislation. But informal practices are more typically used to address the gaps, to deal with the inconsistencies and to reduce the bureaucratic transaction costs commonly associated with all forms of formal regulation…”​[42]​

This does not account however for the public lawyers’ concern that due process must be complied with to produce lawful and compliant decisions, as required by the common law, and as discussed elsewhere in this piece, and by David Mead​[43]​.

Bellamy et al have conducted the largest single study of decision-making in sharing information for pubic protection purposes, and note the following with regard to the problems or varying risk, policy pressure, levels of emergency, bureaucratic demands and so on, which are solved by ‘organic’ information sharing:

 “All these problems mean that managers and their staff cannot operate on the basis of unambiguous national guidance, laws and codes. Still less do they operate within uncontested local interpretations of their underlying ethics and rationale. If frontline information-sharing depends on judgement as much as rules – and therefore as much on tacit understandings as on formal protocols – then in very few of the MAAs [multi-agency arrangements] in our study is there an uncontested basis for building the kind of shared understandings that would support the consistent and confident application of judgement. As a result, the tasks of establishing agreement across the MAA about what counts as appropriate information sharing, let alone of enforcing it, are far from simple.”​[44]​

Bellamy et al do acknowledge that this array of vagaries over public-protection information sharing is unacceptable:

“First, this state of affairs undermines an important precept of justice, namely that like cases should be treated alike. The reliance, to a greater or lesser extent in all MAAs in this study, on pragmatic and particular solutions encouraged by isolate and individualistic forms means that similar cases are almost certainly being treated differently in different MAAs, and probably in the same MAAs at different times. Second, the reliance on informal practices associated with these forms certainly undermines the ability of MAAs, and their member organizations, to assure justice, let alone conformity to law, because it necessarily masks the extent of differences and their outcomes. Despite the assertion of much stronger national prescription, information-sharing practices in British social policy continue, at best, to be lacking in transparency, are inconsistent and unpredictable and, in some cases, may therefore be unjust. At worst, they pose real and present risks of devastating consequences to vulnerable people, or to the potential victims of dangerous ones, while at the same time failing to assure the consistent application of confidentiality norms and privacy principles.”​[45]​

The one disagreement I would have here with Bellamy et al is that there is, or has been an ‘assertion of much stronger national prescription’ in relation to information-sharing practices. The regular work of the courts in dealing with these issues suggests otherwise. There is in fact a web of interlinking legal principles which provide the legal landscape for those information-sharing practices, particularly in the field of criminality information-sharing, and, I would argue, an indistinct legal landscape at times; with too much reliance on case law to promulgate values of due process, proportionality, and what might be said t constitute the public interest. 

I would however readily agree that there is a prevailing lack of transparency, consistency and predictability. Given the mass of evidence Bellamy et al have established in their work this is apparent, however, I would emphasise in a point to Bellamy et al, given their research findings, that it could be argued that more could be done to make the relevant legal framework more certain. It is one thing to say that ‘lay’ decision-makers concerned with public protection may feel uncertain in interpreting the requirements of the law in practice, but as we will see, some judges in our courts would readily agree. 

In conclusion then Bellamy et al postulate that:

“Where the volume of information-sharing is increasing, this may be as much the result of instrumental, individualistic and coping behaviours as of an increase in formal regulation. This, then, is the fundamental policy problem facing national policy-makers in seeking to resolve the apparent dilemma between information sharing and privacy, such that a systematic shift towards more and better information-sharing is achieved.”​[46]​

A substantive legal framework relevant to the sharing of ‘criminality information’

The legal context of personal information sharing across the public sector is most visibly regulated by four principles:
1) The legal context to personal information sharing across the public sector is most broadly regulated in terms of the legal powers (or vires) of the bodies concerned. Public bodies cannot act ultra vires or outside their powers. Their powers consist of express statutory powers, implied statutory powers, and common law powers of information sharing. Depending on which public body within or without the criminal justice system we can see is sharing personal information, a subtly different approach must be taken in that the information sharing powers of those bodies will differ.
2) The legal context to personal information (or ‘personal data’) sharing across the public sector, just as across the private sector, is also regulated by the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998.
3) Since the organisations that make up the array of components within Magee’s “public protection networks” (PPN​[47]​) are public authorities for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, they must look to uphold the ‘right to respect for private life’ possessed by members of the public, which they are owed under art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
4) The equitable doctrine of confidentiality and the partner tort of misuse of private information, as well as the doctrines of defamation, are notions used to broadly protect personal privacy that have evolved in our courts. Suffice to say that is the public authority sharing information as a PPN looks to its duties under statute then these two principles become moot in circumstances where the public authority has shared personal information across the public sector, such is the authority of statutory provisions when considered as legal duties or powers. Importantly, there is a ‘public interest’ defence available with regard to any actions for breach of confidence etc.

Specific statutory provisions enabling personal information sharing
Sometimes a piece of legislation will specifically enable personal information sharing.
One pertinent example of the different qualities of ‘criminality information’ versus more general ‘police intelligence’ is the operation of  S.115 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which enables public authorities to share personal information with the police or another body, such as a local authority, when it is requested in connection with an application for an anti-social behaviour order​[48]​. With regard to what can more certainly be described as ‘criminality information’ rather than mere ‘police intelligence’, specific statutory provisions in relation personal information sharing for criminal justice purposes in England and Wales includes those that underpin the Child Sex Offender Disclosure Scheme (S.327A Criminal Justice Act 2003).
The Police Act 1997 for example, as amended, includes provisions in S.113B that govern the use of ‘police intelligence’, also known as ‘soft intelligence’, by police authorities in disclosing personal information as part of the compilation of Enhanced Criminal Record Certificates (ECRCs). This process is then governed by which information is ‘relevant’ to a particular employment vetting scenario and a consideration of what ‘ought to be included’ in an ECRC. Given the nature of this dual test as one based on both factual relevancy and a consideration of what is proportionate to disclose, and in the light of the extreme sensitivity of the ‘soft intelligence’ concerned, it is no surprise that the interpretations of these provisions by police authorities has been regularly contested in the courts. 
Implied statutory powers regarding sharing personal information 
Many statutes will contain provisions which can be read as creating implied powers for public authorities to share personal information, but only in the specific circumstances concerned. The broadest implication of information sharing powers available to the public authorities in relation to the criminal justice context is found through S.29 of the Data Protection Act 1998.
This section of the Data Protection Act 1998 deals with exemptions from the normal requirements of lawful ‘data processing’ (including what is termed here ‘information sharing’) where the information sharing under consideration is connected to the prevention or detection of crime, the apprehension or investigation of an alleged offender, or the collection of some form of taxation or similar duty.
Not only is context very important as a determinant factor in the lawfulness of sharing personal information, but so is the type of personal information requested.
S.29 of the Data Protection Act 1998 means that the normal principle of processing personal data, here ‘sharing personal information’, fairly and lawfully is reduced to satisfying two particular tests, depending on whether the information being requested is ‘personal data’ – like an address for an individual – or is ‘sensitive personal data’ – such as information relating to criminal convictions, allegations of misconduct or medical records, as particularly relevant examples. It becomes important to identify the purpose(s) for which, and to make the distinction between ‘personal data’ and ‘sensitive personal data’ each time personal information is shared by a public authority in the criminal justice context. 
Sharing personal information that is ‘personal data’ for the purpose of the Data Protection Act 1998
Sharing of personal data is ‘processing for the purposes of the Data Protection Act 1998, and even with the exemption from all the requirements of the first data protection principle (‘fairness and lawfulness’) found in S.29 of the Act the personal data must still be shared in accordance with one of the second schedule data processing rules. For our purposes, this means demonstrating that we are sharing (without consent) personal data because it is necessary to protect the vital interests of the ‘data subject’, or necessary given the legitimate interests of the third party with which the personal data is shared (e.g. the police etc), though never where the processing is “unwarranted in any particular case by reason of prejudice to the rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of the data subject”.
Plainly, the key test is connected to that which can be considered “prejudice to the rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of the data subject”. Plainly, to act unlawfully in regard to those particular rights, freedoms and interests would be to prejudice them.
The key right, freedom or legitimate interest at stake, since we are concerned with personal information sharing by a public authority for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, is the art. 8 ECHR right to respect for private life enjoyed by every data subject when their personal data is shared, as acknowledged by the leading case of L​[49]​. The right to respect for private life is ‘engaged’ by the sharing itself, and will be unlawfully ‘infringed’ (entailing an actionable breach of S.6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998) unless that infringement is legitimate, proportionate and necessary in a democratic society.
Plainly the sharing of personal data with the kinds of criminal justice, taxation and immigration agencies envisaged by the scope of this report is necessary in a democratic society – the Magee Report in 2008 spoke of the creation in the UK information society of “Public Protection Networks” and emphasised their importance in safeguarding the public​[50]​.
The Data Protection Act 1998, with its implied powers to share information for public authorities, ensures a public authority is plainly acting legitimately as long as it accounts for the second schedule processing rule in relation to non-consensual sharing, as outlined above – which brings us full circle to the notion of sharing information proportionately. 
Proportionality or the lack thereof is a ground of judicial review of the actions and decisions of UK public authorities. It relies as a test of lawfulness on a measurement of the balancing exercise the relevant public authority has undertaken when deliberating the impact and harms on an individual or group of individuals when taking some action or decision with a particular motivation or purpose. L is a superb example of how this balancing exercise must be free of presumptions. It cannot be said, following L, that the safeguarding of children or vulnerable adults is a priority over the right to respect for private life and individual enjoys. Each potential personal data sharing decision must be analysed on its merits. To this end, the factual relevancy of the personal data that may be shared to the aims and outcomes of that sharing must be fully and demonstrably taken into account in any kind of ‘checklist’ approach to decision making, as noted above. ‘Relevancy’ then, as a key notion within a test for proportionality, does not exist solely as a one leg of the dual test in S.113B of the Police Act 1997 in the ECRC ‘soft intelligence’ context, but in all personal information sharing contexts connected with the criminal justice system in England and Wales.
Sharing personal information that is ‘sensitive personal data’ for the purpose of the Data Protection Act 1998
It may be that a public authority has occasion to share information relating to criminal convictions, allegations of criminal behaviour or misconduct, or other unproven but worrying concerns. This information is ‘sensitive personal data’ for the purposes of the Data Protection Act 1998. In this sort of instance, the third condition of the third schedule of the Data Protection Act 1998 comes to bear – requiring that the public authority concerned share this personal data only to protect “the vital interests of a person” other than the data subject i.e. a classic safeguarding/public protection rationale. Again, the sharing of ‘sensitive personal data’ will engage the art. 8 ECHR right to respect for private life – returning us to the importance of proportionality in sharing information.
Confidentiality and the misuse of private information
The public interest defence to an action for breach of confidentiality and the notion of the tortious misuse of private information are secondary concerns, since both of these are wrapped up in art. 8 ECHR values and case law in this particular context; and so the statutory framework of the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Human Rights Act 1998 remains our chief concern as to the lawfulness of sharing (sensitive) personal data.


A Focus on Relevant Case Law 

The importance of case law to interpret the statutory framework and inform our codification argument
Cases decided in the UK courts help us to ascertain what approach the a particular public authority can take in sharing information either reactively to requests from criminal justice, taxation and immigration agencies, or proactively sharing information due to safeguarding/public protection concerns.
R (L) v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKSC 3
L is the leading case in the area of ‘criminality information’-sharing (CIS) across the public sector, and emphasises that a truly balanced approach to decision-making must be taken to accord with the notion of proportionality, since art. 8 ECHR rights of data subjects are engaged in this situation. There is also a requirement in the common law that the subject of what we can term ‘criminality information’ be consulted where appropriate before information is shared​[51]​.
H & L v A City Council [2011] EWCA Civ 403
H & L demonstrates that the approach to sharing personal data in a context which sees art. 8 ECHR rights engaged must be fair, balanced and proportionate. H & L is a case involving the proactive sharing by a local authority of information relating to criminal convictions – and in this case the Court of Appeal held that this required that the local authority in sharing the information should have sought to consult the data subject, H, before the sharing took place. However, in this case there was an acknowledged lack of factual relevance in the sharing of the sensitive personal data (i.e. no link between the role H was involved in and the nature of his convictions), and the case involved the proactive information sharing context, making consultation practically more feasible. 
Lord Munby gave an excellent summation of Article 8’s procedural requirements in H & L, noting that in information-sharing cases there are:
“standards of procedural fairness mandated in circumstances such as this both by the common law and by Article 8 . As to the former, in R v Chief Constable of the North Wales Police ex p Thorpe [1999] QB 396 , page 428, Lord Woolf MR said that before deciding whether or not to disclose the information the police should have consulted the persons about whom disclosure was being contemplated, disclosing the gist of the relevant information to them and giving them an opportunity to comment.”​[52]​
Further, it  could be implied that in the context of sharing ‘personal data’, where the second schedule processing rules in the Data Protection Act 1998, still of key concern in the S.29 exemption for ‘crime and taxation’ context, include specific consent-based processing options, such as contractual agreements etc, and the additional option of processing (here, ‘sharing’) personal data because it is necessary to protect the vital interests of the ‘data subject’, or necessary given the legitimate interests of the third party with which the personal data is shared (e.g. the police etc), though never where the processing is “unwarranted in any particular case by reason of prejudice to the rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of the data subject”, that it is statutorily implied that some processing and therefore sharing of personal data will be non-consensual and therefore occur without consulting the data subject concerned​[53]​. Of course, ‘proportionality’ will still be a vital factor in this rationale for non-consensual disclosure, given the ‘interpretive’ provisions of S.3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, where in our particular information sharing contexts art. 8 ECHR rights are engaged and therefore ‘read into’ statutory provisions by the UK courts.
Much of the case law in the area involves the Enhanced Criminal Record Certificate (ECRC) application context for policing authorities, whereas this task of ‘criminality’ may be a less common circumstance of decision-making by a particular public authority such as a local authority.
In terms of more ‘organic’ criminality information sharing, away from the ECRC context, the case of R (A) v B [2010] EWHC 2361 (Admin) shows that it is unlawful for the police to share information with the employers of an individual, outside the ECRC process, where there is no evidence of a criminal act by the individual, only evidence of unusual (non-criminal) sexual behaviour. This case would suggest that the public authorities should only share evidence of particular offences/convictions where this would be done to protect the “vital interests” of another person, in the safeguarding/public protection sense, rather than simply morally-questionable behaviour. The Court of Appeal case of R (C) v Secretary of State for Justice & Another [2011] EWCA Civ 175 showed that some allegations will be relevant in sharing information to protect the public/safeguard children or vulnerable people, though again, proportionality is key. Proportionality and factual relevancy, as mentioned above, are the two legal tests from S.113B of the Police Act 1997, the statutory provisions relevant in C since this is a ‘soft intelligence’ case involving the ECRC process. The emphasis on the core issue of ‘proportionality’ is unmistakable.
The requirement of consultation with subjects of ‘criminality information’ before the information itself is shared is an emerging requirement in the common law.

But, according to Wilson LJ we needn’t be too concerned “on behalf of Chief Constables” as the common law “suggests the impracticability of any substantial degree of consultation between Chief Constables and applicants prior to issue of [Enhanced Criminal Record Certificates]”, since this requires only, in Wilson LJ’s view, “a degree of consultation”​[54]​, as per Neuberger LJ in R (L) v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKSC 3 at para. 82.  

Munby LJ explains the issue in full for us: 

Article 8 likewise has an important procedural component. Long-established Strasbourg
jurisprudence, articulated by the court as long ago as 1988 (see W v United Kingdom (1988) 10 EHRR 29 , paras [63]–[64]), requires that, where Article 8 is engaged, the local authority's decision-making process must be such as to secure that the views and interests of those who will be adversely affected by its decision are made known to and duly taken into account by the local authority, and such as to enable them to exercise in due time any remedies available to them. The question, according to the court, is whether, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and the serious nature of the decisions to be taken, those affected have been involved in the decision-making process, seen as a whole, to a degree sufficient to provide them with the requisite protection of their interest... In L, the Supreme Court, disapproving what Lord Woolf CJ had said in R (X) v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [2004] EWCA Civ 1068, [2005] 1 WLR 65 , para [37], pointed to the need to consult with the person whose information is to be disclosed and to give them an opportunity of making representations before the information is disclosed: see Lord Hope of Craighead (para [46]), Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (para [63]) and Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury MR (paras [82], [84]). As Lord Neuberger said (para [84]), “the imposition of such a duty is a necessary ingredient of the process if it is to be fair and proportionate.”​[55]​

Wilson LJ also notes that “although no doubt in some cases the appropriate form of contact might be face-to-face contact, in [a situation involving the creation of Enhanced Criminal Record Certificates] I would consider that it would be reasonable for the Chief Constable to send to the applicant a letter enclosing a draft of the proposed certificate and inviting his comments thereon. If a response to that was to be that the applicant sought a face-to-face contact with a police officer in relation to these matters, the merits of the request would have to be weighed. But I would not disagree that it was appropriate in a number of cases… for the contact with the applicant to be [contacted] by letter”​[56]​.

The issue though is that there is no statutory guidance as to what an appropriate degree of consultation might be in particular circumstances – and this is perhaps where statutory codification or better, perhaps, statutory specificity, would be or real and meaningful assistance to Chief Constables and other responsible for the sharing of ‘criminality information’ across the public sector.

The distinction between ECRC disclosure of convictions, or cautions and warnings, as opposed to ‘soft intelligence’ or purely ‘public protection information’: T (Thomas) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2012] EWHC 147 (Admin)

What are the distinctions between ECRC disclosure of convictions, or cautions and warnings, as opposed to ‘soft intelligence’ or purely ‘public protection information’?

It is argued that is currently the case that there is some limited procedural protection from severe stigmatisation in employment and other contexts because of a requirement of consultation with regard to the disclosure of unproven allegation and other ‘soft intelligence’ about individuals​[57]​. 

Is it the case though that such procedural protection does not apply with regard to the regular disclosure of convictions and cautions or warnings, in the context of sensitive employability contexts, given decision of the highest appellate court in the UK in legitismising the current, stigmatising framework? 

In the UKSC decision in R(L) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2009] UKSC 3 [2010] 1 AC 410, it seems that Lord Neuberger (at para. 76) makes a distinction between ‘public’ criminality information and ‘information’ as ‘soft’ or ‘police intelligence’ which is best regarded as ‘public protection information’:

“Given that, in relation to children-related posts, the section is limited to those seeking employment involving “regular..” responsibility for young people, I am prepared to proceed on the basis that there is nothing objectionable in the requirement that an ECRC must contain the information [i.e. convitions and cautions] referred to in section 115(6)(a)(i), as expanded by the definition of “relevant matter” in section 113(5), even though it may on occasions be rather harsh on the applicant concerned. As Lord Woolf MR said in R(X) v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [2005] 1 WLR 65, para 20, Parliament “must … be entitled to enable information to be available to prospective employers, where the nature of the employment means that particular care should be taken to ensure that those who are working with the appropriate categories of persons can be relied on to do so …”. Whether as a result of a conviction or a caution (which involves the person concerned having admitted committing the offence in question), there can be little doubt that the information in question will be accurate, and will have been sufficiently grave as to amount to a crime.”  

Drawing on this Kenneth Parker J says (at para. 47), in relation to the lack of discretion with regard to ‘blanket’ sharing convictions and cautions or warnings in an Enhanced Criminal Records Certificate (ECRC) under provisions of the Police Act 1997:

“I feel constrained by binding authority​[58]​ to conclude that the challenged provisions of the 1997 Act are compatible with Article 8 ECHR, although if I had not been so constrained I would have found that the present system that allows no exceptions and provides no mechanism for review was disproportionate and not compatible with Article 8…​[59]​ In these circumstances, I dismiss this application for judicial review, albeit with some reluctance.  The issue is one of general importance that fully deserves to be considered by a higher court, and I had already indicated that I would give permission to the unsuccessful party to appeal to the Court of Appeal.” 

In his judgment Kenneth Parker K notes the impact of the ‘Five Forces’ decision in enabling the indefinite retention of convictions, cautions or warnings and other categories of ‘unproven’ criminality information​[60]​. Kenneth Parker J also notes the calls made by Sunita Mason and others in relation to a potentially more complex screening approach​[61]​.

Kenneth Parker J’s comments in obiter though (at para. 35) are enlightened, and enlightening:

“I have no doubt that the disclosure provisions of the 1997 Act broadly strike a fair balance between the competing interests described by Lord Neuberger in L.  It is the application of these provisions in particular cases that gives me concern.  I can understand that a system which admits of no exceptions for the disclosure of convictions and cautions removes, or should remove, entirely the risk that information that might be relevant is not available to the decision maker, who may as a result take a decision which, in the interests of safety, would not otherwise have been taken.  But a system that allows no exceptions imposes a very heavy cost in terms of effect on the fundamental rights protected by Article 8 ECHR.  I am not persuaded that the marginal benefit that a system which admits no exceptions brings to, admittedly important, competing interests is justified as a matter of proportionality when the serious detrimental effects of such a system, particularly on child offenders, are weighed in the balance.  A system that permitted exceptions would probably be more prone to error, but only marginally so if the criteria for review were themselves conservative and risk averse.  The consequential improvement to the protection of Article 8 rights on the other hand, would be likely to be substantial.  There is also a further possible cost of the present system.  If the child, and his or her parents, understand, as they should, that the acceptance of a caution creates a criminal record that will always remain with the child, and potentially affect future prospects, there may be a perverse incentive to contest the charge, a result that is also in tension with the current public policy of exposing children to the criminal justice system only if necessary.  On the other hand, a system that allowed a caution to be expunged after an appropriate period of non-offending might be thought to create an efficient and sensible incentive to avoid such re-offending.”
 
Interestingly, Kenneth Parker J does draw our attention to the useful comparison we can make with bad character evidence in relation to the concept of ‘criminality information’ or ‘public protection information’ etc:

“For the purposes of the bad character provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 experienced criminal judges regularly “filter” ancient convictions as having no relevance to, or as having potentially a disproportionately prejudicial effect on, the resolution of any relevant issue in the trial.  Indeed, the prosecution often does its own “sifting” and makes no application for the admission of the material.  This is particularly so if the offence in question was committed when the accused was a child.  In relation to the “dangerousness” provisions of the 2003 Act (when ex hypothesi the defendant has committed a serious specified sexual or violent offence), the Court of Appeal has repeatedly stressed that children develop and mature, and that it is important to be particularly careful and cautious in seeking in the case of children to make adverse predictions of future behaviour.”​[62]​

The retention of criminality information: Revisiting the decision of the Court of Appeal in ‘Five Forces’

In the Court of Appeal decision known as Five Forces five Chief Constables succeeded in arguing that the model of indefinitely retaining conviction data and ‘soft intelligence’ on the Police National was lawful despite arguments as to the curtailment of data protection rights and human rights to a private life. The Information Commissioner was unsuccessful in establishing that an earlier decision of the Information Tribunal was correct  in declaring the PNC operation unlawful because of the indefinite retention of personal data of the most sensitive kind, known commonly and variously as ‘criminal records’, ‘criminality information’, ‘police intelligence’, or ‘conviction data’.

According to the Court of Appeal, the legislative basis of the national records system was such that the Data Protection Act 1998 and its interaction with other statutes enabling police ‘operational purposes’ afforded the notion of lawful operation to this system. Furthermore the Court found that Article 8 of the European Court of Human Rights was not engaged with respect to the indefinite retention of the records concerned​[63]​. Waller LJ opined:

“I am not persuaded that article 8(1) is engaged at all in relation to the retention of the record of a conviction. Disclosure might be another matter but this appeal is not about disclosure. Even if that were wrong, if my conclusions so far are right, the processing is in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society. I do not think any extra point arises by reference to article 8 on its own and I mean no disrespect in dealing with this aspect so shortly.”​[64]​

However, in some judgments since the accuracy of the data held on the PNC has been challenged in the context of it being shared. In the case of C v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [2010] EWHC 1601 the High Court judge, Langstaff J, noted approvingly that the wording of the applicant’s data on the PNC had been amended to make it more accurate, and less distorting of the allegations made against C; though the primary issue in the case was the (un)lawfulness of the allegations about C being shared​[65]​. This High Court decision was admittedly overturned in the later case of C v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [2011] EWCA Civ 175; where the Court of Appeal determined that the allegations could in fact be shared lawfully, though there was no suggestion by the Court of Appeal that the amendment of the language of the entry on the PNC was an incorrect adjustment of the police records.





One serious issue established is that while the legal framework with regard to criminality information sharing for public protection purposes may be complex, it is currently lacking one vital ingredient with regard to the sharing of ‘soft intelligence’ data: there is no statutory guidance as to what an appropriate degree of consultation might be in particular circumstances of sharing criminality information that is not simply convictions or cautions data etc – and this is perhaps where statutory codification or better, perhaps, statutory specificity, along the lines of the ‘gateways’ for the admissibility of ‘bad character’ evidence in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, would be or real and meaningful assistance to Chief Constables and other responsible for the sharing of ‘criminality information’ across the public sector.

More profoundly, we must ask a more moral question of the current statutory framework that is inflexible, as Kenneth Parker J has noted (see above), with regard to the disclosure of convictions and cautions, however foggy and distant these offences may (or may not) be.






^1	  See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/workinggroup/index_en.htm (Accessed at 12/07/11)
^2	  See the ‘Tasks of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party’ set out at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/tasks-art-29_en.pdf (Accessed at 12/07/11)
^3	  See http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/dec/ep-dp-leas-draft-directive.pdf (Accessed at 01/02/12)
^4	  The notion of a British Bill of Rights is being explored by a Commission on a Bill of Rights, see http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/cbr/index.htm (Accessed at 12/07/11)
^5	  For an overview of the expected stances from members of the Commission on a Bill of Rights, see http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/mar/18/british-bill-of-rights-faces-deadlock (Accessed at 12/07/11)
^6	  See Alan Travis and Owen Bowcott, ‘Kenneth Clarke to 'wipe slate clean' for hundreds of thousands of ex-offenders’, Friday February 3 2012, The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2012/feb/02/kenneth-clarke-wipe-slate-clean-exoffenders (Accessed at 06/02/12)
^7	  See http://www.justice.gov.uk/news/press-releases/moj/pressrelease030212.htm (Accessed at 06/02/12)
^8	  See R v Ibrahim [2010] EWCA Crim 1176
^9	  R v Hamer [2010] EWCA Crim 2053
^10	  For example, see the ‘bad character’ ‘gateways’ of S.101 Criminal Justice Act 2003, or the provisions outlining the possible extent of hearsay evidence admissible in the ‘interests of justice’, set out in S.114 Criminal Justice Act 2003.
^11	  R v Chief Constable of the North Wales Police and Others, Ex parte Thorpe and Another [1998] 3 W.L.R. 57; R. v Local Authority in the Midlands Ex p. LM 1999 WL 1579630; R (X) v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [2004] EWCA Civ 1068; R. (on the application of Pinnington) v Chief Constable of Thames Valley [2008] EWHC 1870 (Admin); W v Chief Constable of Northumbria [2009] EWHC 747 (Admin); R (L) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKSC 3; N v A Local Authority [2010] EWHC 3602 (Admin); C v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [2010] EWHC 1601 (Admin); C v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [2011] EWCA Civ 175; H and L v A City Council [2010] EWHC 466 (Admin); H and L v A City Council [2011] EWCA Civ 403 and R. (on the application of S) v Chief Constable of West Mercia [2008] EWHC 2811 (Admin); Official Transcript; QBD (Admin)
^12	  R (Ahmed) v Secretary of State for Justice [2011] EWHC 1332 (Admin)
^13	  See Rotaru v Romania (28341/95) 8 B.H.R.C. 449 and Segerstedt-Wiberg v Sweden 62332/00 (2007) 44 E.H.R.R. 2
^14	  See Boudewijn De Bruin, ‘The liberal value of privacy’, Law & Phil. 2010, 29(5), 505-534
^15	  See Moreham, N.A., ‘The right to respect for private life in the European Convention on Human Rights: a re-examination’, E.H.R.L.R. 2008.
^16	  Von Hannover v Germany No.2 [2012] (Applications nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08)
^17	  See Axel Springer v Germany[2012] (Application no. 39954/08)
^18	  Association of Chief Police Officers (2010), Guidance on Protecting the Public, 2nd edn., p.137.
^19	  Association of Chief Police Officers (2010), Guidance on Protecting the Public, 2nd edn., p.138.
^20	  See Boudewijn De Bruin, ‘The liberal value of privacy’, Law & Phil. 2010, 29(5), 505-534 at p.512
^21	  See Thomas, R. (Information Commissioner) & Walport, M., Information Commissioner's Office, Data Sharing Review Report, ICO, July 2008
^22	  See Ryan M. Calo, ‘The Boundaries of Privacy Harm’, Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 86, No. 3, 2011.
^23	  Public protection is a duty that falls upon any number of government agencies in a myriad of fields – and the work of public authorities, as I shall name them, in enhancing levels of public protection is best described in the complex mapping exercise conducted as empirical research in Catherine Bellamy et al. See Catherine Bellamy et al, ‘Information-sharing and confidentiality in social policy: Regulating Multi-Agency Working’, Public Administration Vol. 86, No. 3, 2008 (737–759).
^24	  See Sir Ian Magee, The Review of Criminality Information, 2008, p.14
^25	  Magee: “I define criminality information as any information which is, or may be, relevant to the prevention, investigation, prosecution or penalising of crime.” Ibid, p.4
^26	  S.1 Data Protection Act 1998
^27	  Ibid.
^28	  S.40 Freedom of Information Act 2000
^29	  See Association of Chief Police Officers (2010), Guidance on Protecting the Public, 2nd edn. See also ACPO (2010), Guidance on the Management of Police Information, 2nd edn. Appendix 6 of the latter has a template information sharing agreement for police use with different kinds of public authorities.
^30	  See Roger Clarke, ‘Information Technology and Dataveillance’, Commun. ACM 31,5 (May 1988) 498-512
^31	  For example, with regard to the implementation of a European Arrest Warrant scheme.
^32	  See Timothy Pitt-Payne, ‘Employment: The Shadow of the Past’, 159 NLJ 1530
^33	  See R (Ahmed) v Secretary of State for Justice [2011] EWHC 1332 (Admin), described below.
^34	  Ibid.
^35	  Ibid.
^36	  See Timothy Pitt-Payne, ‘Employment: The Shadow of the Past’, 159 NLJ 1530
^37	  See Sunita Mason, ‘A Common Sense Approach: A review of the criminal records regime in England & Wales; Report on Phase 1’, February 2011, p.27
^38	  Sunita Mason (Independent Advisor for Criminality Information Management), ‘A Balanced Approach: Safeguarding the public through the fair and proportionate use of accurate criminal record information’, March 2010, p.20.
^39	  Sunita Mason, ‘A Common Sense Approach: A review of the criminal records regime in England & Wales; Report on Phase 1’, February 2011, p.30-37.
^40	  For example, Mason recommends that the Enhanced Criminal Record Certificate feature a statement of reasons as to why certain pieces of ‘criminality information’ etc have been included. See Sunita Mason, ‘A Common Sense Approach: A review of the criminal records regime in England & Wales; Report on Phase 1’, February 2011, p.34.
^41	  See Part 5, Chapter 2 of the Protection of Freedoms Bill, from http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2010-11/protectionoffreedoms.html (Accessed at 21/11/11) in conjunction with S.113B of the Police Act 1997 as amended.
^42	  See Catherine Bellamy et al, ‘Information-sharing and confidentiality in social policy: Regulating Multi-Agency Working’, Public Administration Vol. 86, No. 3, 2008 (737–759)
^43	  See David Mead, ‘Outcomes aren't all: defending process-based review of public authority decisions under the Human Rights Act’, P.L. 2012, Jan, 61-84. 
^44	  See Catherine Bellamy et al, ‘Information-sharing and confidentiality in social policy: Regulating Multi-Agency Working’, Public Administration Vol. 86, No. 3, 2008 (737–759)
^45	  Ibid.
^46	  See Catherine Bellamy et al, ‘Information-sharing and confidentiality in social policy: Regulating Multi-Agency Working’, Public Administration Vol. 86, No. 3, 2008 (737–759).
^47	  See Sir Ian Magee, The Review of Criminality Information, 2008, p.14
^48	  Though empirical research by Bellamy et al suggests that police and other public authorities have believed that the information-sharing powers under S.115 of the 1998 Act are in fact much broader than this. This is an example of the potential benefits of the socio-legal methodology in this particular context. See Catherine Bellamy et al, ‘Information-sharing and confidentiality in social policy: Regulating Multi-Agency Working’, Public Administration Vol. 86, No. 3, 2008 (737–759). In truth the courts are often disparaging when the ‘non-lawyers’ of a local authority misrepresent the law, or legal processes: see N v A Local Authority [2010] EWHC 3602 (Admin).
^49	  R (L) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKSC 3
^50	  See Sir Ian Magee, The Review of Criminality Information, 2008, p.14
^51	  Neuberger LJ in R (L) v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKSC 3 at para. 82.
^52	  Munby LJ in H & L v A City Council [2011] EWCA Civ 403 at para. 50-52. Interestingly, when it comes to the limited right in art. 8 ECHR, and though he is critical of this perception, David Mead is of the opinion that such ECHR-based proportionality need not include a procedural element to it, suggesting this is in fact ‘set in stone’ by the ‘triptych’ of House of Lords cases in R. (Begum) v Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15, Belfast City Council v Miss Behavin' Ltd [2007] UKHL 19, and R. (on the application of Nasseri) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] UKHL 23, where for the purposes of the proportionality test, ‘outcome is all’. See David Mead, ‘Outcomes aren't all: defending process-based review of public authority decisions under the Human Rights Act’, P.L. 2012, Jan, 61-84. 
^53	  Or even decisions made where art. 8 ECHR is engaged but the public authority concerned could not have had full regard to the ECHR rights to be consulted of a data subject because of overriding public policy/public protection grounds: after all, Lord Hoffman  said in Miss Behavin' [2007] UKHL 19 at [13]: “What was the council supposed to have said? ‘We have thought very seriously about your Convention rights but we think that the appropriate number of sex shops in the locality is nil’? Or: ‘Taking into account article 10 and article 1 of the First Protocol and doing the best we can, we think that the appropriate number is nil’? Would it have been sufficient to say that they had taken Convention rights into account, or would they have had to specify the right ones?” Again, see David Mead, ‘Outcomes aren't all: defending process-based review of public authority decisions under the Human Rights Act’, P.L. 2012, Jan, 61-84.
^54	  Wilson LJ in R (C) v Secretary of State for Justice & Another [2011] EWCA Civ 175 at para. 25
^55	  Munby LJ in H & L v A City Council [2011] EWCA Civ 403 at para. 50-52. Interestingly, when it comes to the limited right in art. 8 ECHR, and though he is critical of this perception, David Mead is of the opinion that such ECHR-based proportionality need not include a procedural element to it, suggesting this is in fact ‘set in stone’ by the ‘triptych’ of House of Lords cases in R. (Begum) v Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15, Belfast City Council v Miss Behavin' Ltd [2007] UKHL 19, and R. (on the application of Nasseri) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] UKHL 23, where for the purposes of the proportionality test, ‘outcome is all’. See David Mead, ‘Outcomes aren't all: defending process-based review of public authority decisions under the Human Rights Act’, P.L. 2012, Jan, 61-84. 
^56	  Ibid.
^57	  See Munby LJ at paras. 49-62 in H and L v A City Council [2011] EWCA Civ 403.
^58	  This is the UKSC decision in R(L) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2009] UKSC 3 [2010] 1 AC 410.
^59	  Kenneth Parker J acknowledges the ‘powerful argument’ made against the stigmatising effect of inflexibility in criminal justice matters in interaction with civil society in the “unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in R(F) v Justice Secretary [2010] UKSC 17; [2011] 1 AC 331”. See paras. 19-24.
^60	  At para. 2: “The warning [in question in T] had previously been “stepped down” in 2009 under procedures then operated but had been later reinstated following the decision of the Court of Appeal in Chief Constable of Humberside Police v Information Commissioner [2009] EWCA Civ 1079 [2010] 1WLR 1136.”
^61	  See Kenneth Parker J’s comments on Breaking the Cycle.  Effective Punishment, Rehabilitation and Sentencing of Offenders (cm 7972, December 2010) (at para. 43), Sunita Mason, ‘A Common Sense Approach: A review of the criminal records regime in England & Wales; Report on Phase 1’, February 2011 and Sunita Mason (Independent Advisor for Criminality Information Management), ‘A Balanced Approach: Safeguarding the public through the fair and proportionate use of accurate criminal record information’, March 2010 (at paras. 26-32).
^62	  In T (Thomas) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2012] EWHC 147 (Admin) at para. 31.
^63	  See Chief Constable of Humberside Police and others v Information Commissioner [2009] EWCA Civ 1079
^64	  Op. Cit. at para. 50.
^65	  Langstaff J in C v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [2010] EWHC 1601at para. 43.
^66	  See Mikolajova v. Slovaki [2011] (4479/03 )and Khelili v. Switzerland [2011] (16188/07)
